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In the Internet of Things (IoT), security and privacy issues of physical objects are crucial to the related applica-
tions. In order to clarify the complicated security and privacy issues, the life cycle of a physical object is divided
into three stages of pre-working, in-working, and post-working. On this basis, a physical object-based security
architecture for the IoT is put forward. According to the security architecture, security and privacy requirements
and related protecting technologies for physical objects in different working stages are analyzed in detail.
Considering the development of IoT technologies, potential security and privacy challenges that IoT objects may
face in the pervasive computing environment are summarized. At the same time, possible directions for dealing
with these challenges are also pointed out.1. Introduction
The basic function of the Internet of Things (IoT) system is to collect
data from the physical world and provide services for users according to
their requests or the results of data processing. Cyber entities in the IoT
are always mapped to physical objects that have the ability to interact
with each other [1]. They collaborate to complete specific tasks. As an
application-driven network, the IoT has been applied not only in aca-
demic research or industrial field, but also in daily life, such as smart grid,
e-health, e-home, environment monitoring, smart city, and so on [2].
Furthermore, cross-application or cross-domain IoTs [3,4] are very
common now. Since these IoT-based applications are always related to
daily life or work, more and more people begin to concern privacy [5],
and at the same time, the security problems become more and more
complicated.
Physical objects as the core of the IoT, and their security and privacy
are crucial to IoTs and their applications. Physical objects in the IoT have
six distinctive features [1]: spatiotemporal inconsistency, multi-identity
coexistence, high heterogeneity, resource-constraint, dynamics, and so-
cial awareness, making their security and privacy issues very compli-
cated, and the traditional security and privacy-preserving mechanisms
are unsuitable or ineffective for them. Most of existing security archi-
tectures only focus on the security issues in the perception layer, network
layer, and application layer [6,7]. They cannot fully describe the securityNing).
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rg/10.1016/j.dcan.2020.09.00and privacy issues of the IoT. Huansheng Ning et al. put forward a se-
curity architecture for their Unit and Ubiquitous IoT (U2IoT) [8], which
extends the traditional IoT security architecture. Since it is modeled from
the aspects of information security in the cyber world, physical security
in the physical world, and management security in human society, it
comprehensively covers the security issues of U2IoT. However, the
cyber-physical-social security architecture is designed for U2IoT and not
universal to the IoT-based pervasive computing environment. In addi-
tion, the privacy issue is not considered enough.
To address these problems, we try to divide the life cycle of the IoT
physical object into three stages of pre-working, in-working, and post-
working according to their working status. On this basis, we construct
a security architecture based on physical objects in order to analyze the
security and privacy issues in the three stages respectively.
2. The physical object-based security architecture for IoT
The physical object-based security architecture for the IoT is con-
structed according to the objects’ status and the IoT’s architecture, as
shown in Fig. 1. It can be seen that physical objects in different stages
have different characteristics, security and privacy problems. For clarity,
physical objects are analyzed from the three stages respectively.September 2020
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Fig. 1. The physical object-based security architecture for the Internet of Things.
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The physical object in pre-working is the entity ready to access the
IoT, and its status is essentially the process of mapping the entity in the
physical world to a cyber object in the IoT. The mapping process includes
two phases of initialization and connection.
In the initialization phase, the required data, parameters and func-
tions are preloaded to the physical object, which is usually done by its
owner or the legal operator in the secure environment. And the physical
object is inactive at this time, its security and privacy-preserving re-
quirements can be met by physical tools, social means and management
measures.
In the connection phase, the physical object becomes active and tries
to connect to the specific IoT. As a stranger, it may be denied accessing
the legal IoT or be connected to an unintended, illegal or malicious IoT.
The former will inevitably lead to access failure, and the latter may lead
to data leakage or being attacked. To avoid these security and privacy
problems, both the physical object and the IoT need to perform the
appropriate security mechanisms. For the physical object to be an IoT
node, the premise of its security and privacy-preserving is to check
whether the IoT is the one that it is expected to access. It is usually
achieved by authenticating the physical object or specific node in the IoT.
And for the IoT, it is a prerequisite to verify the legitimacy of the strange
physical object so as to avoid the illegal or malicious node joining it. It is
usually done by the IoT’s nodes within the stranger’s communication
range and requires the strange connector to provide some identity data,
which may cause privacy breach. In summary, mutual authentication
with privacy-preserving is a common way to realize a secure connection.2.2. Physical objects in in-working
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that physical objects in in-working span the
three layers of the IoT’s architecture. In each layer, there are different
tasks, security, and privacy problems.
2.2.1. Physical objects in the perception and executive layer
Most of the physical objects in the perception and executive layer are
various nodes with the ability of sensing. And some objects also have the
ability to execute the instructions. They usually have limited resources2
and are deployed in unattended locations. These nodes are not only
responsible for data sensing, collecting, aggregating, but also involved in
data using and sharing, and even the execution of commands. Since data
is the foundation of IoT-based applications, the security of data is of
paramount importance, which largely depends on the security of physical
objects.
The common attacks on physical objects in the perception and exec-
utive layer mainly include the attacks on the physical nodes themselves
and the sensed data. The former usually includes physical destruction,
battery draining, illegal reading, and writing, etc., which are generally
launched by the attacker close to the physical target object and with the
purpose of destroying, disabling the physical object, stealing or falsifying
its configuration. In order to resist these attacks, it is necessary to
enhance the security of the physical object in its designing phase and
provide indispensable security measures in physical objects. Attacks on
the sensed data are usually launched during data collecting, transmitting,
and using, such as forging, hijacking, tampering, eavesdropping and
replaying the sensed data. They may cause data disclosure, loss, abuse or
malicious use, out of date or spatiotemporal inconsistency, etc., and
further harm the attacked physical object itself and its owner or user. In
order to prevent these attacks and secure the sensed data, encryption,
authentication, hash and secure routing mechanism are often used.
2.2.2. Physical objects in the networking layer
The networking layer is a dynamic and heterogeneous communica-
tion infrastructure formed by connecting various access networks (such
as WiFi, WiMax, 4G, 5G, etc.) to the Internet. It is responsible for trans-
mitting the data acquired from the perception layer to the data or control
center. Physical objects in the networking layer are usually edge nodes in
the IoT, which act as the gateway. Since IP-based communication is the
main communication mode, all the security and privacy vulnerabilities in
the IP networks are in front of physical objects in the networking layer. At
the same time, various connection, security and privacy requirements of
physical objects in the perception and executive layers have to be met. In
practice, these physical objects are also heterogeneous and dynamical.
Furthermore, they are usually resource-constraint in most cases. To deal
with these security and privacy problems, lightweight authentication,
encryption and privacy-preserving mechanisms are necessary.
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Physical objects in the application layer are usually IoT users and
actuators or executors. IoT users usually aim to obtain data or services
from the system, and actuators/executors are usually responsible for
receiving instructions from the system and performing the specified task.
Nowadays, IoT covers a wide range of applications, from smart homes
(e.g., smart light, smart home appliances), smart healthcare (e.g., tele-
medicine, real-time health monitoring) to smart industries (e.g., digital
manufacturing, environmental monitoring) and smart cities (e.g., smart
traffic, smart parking), etc. All of them are data-driven [9]. Since data
always changes with applications, the security and privacy issues of
physical objects in the application layer are very complicated.
For one thing, different applications have different requirements for
data and privacy and face different security issues. For instance, in smart
health, the data is closely related to the user’s privacy, and its accuracy
and correctness are crucial to the user’s life. While in the smart city, data
is usually from crowdsensing, most of the data is insensitive, and the
accuracy requirement is not as strict as in smart health.
For another, the application layer is also the data sharing and pro-
cessing platform for multiple applications, and secure data sharing and
processing are very important. Furthermore, the data in the application
layer is always directly or indirectly associated with the physical object’s
user or owner, so data processing and sharing have to face the challenge
of privacy leakage.
In order to protect the security and privacy of the physical objects
involved in the application layer, authentication, access control and
secure data processing methods with privacy-preserving are always
indispensable.
2.3. Physical objects in post-working
Physical objects in post-working are usually offline, idle or even
discarded nodes. They are vulnerable to being compromised by an
attacker. Since the data in these physical objects may be related to the
security and/or the privacy of the IoT and the users, they are always
targets of attack. The data leakage of physical objects in post-working not
only threatens the security of the IoT, but also makes the physical objects
in in-working vulnerable to being attacked, compromised, and privacy
leakage.
To deal with the security and privacy problems of physical objects in
post-working, lightweight authentication and access control are pre-
requisites. In addition, some physical protection measures or self-
destruction mechanisms are also very effective. Physical protection
measures make the illegal reading and writing very hard or infeasible.
And the self-destruction mechanism will be triggered when an unau-
thorized operation occurs, which makes physical objects and/or the data
in them unusable. However, these two mechanisms are often difficult or
costly to implement.
3. Security and privacy issues of physical objects in pre-working
In the initialization state, physical objects are usually pre-loaded with
some security parameters and/or work in a security and trusted envi-
ronment, so the security and privacy-preserving requirements can be
guaranteed. In the connection state, a physical object tries to access an
existing IoT or connect with other physical objects. Since both sides do
not know each other in advance, there are many security and privacy
problems, such as data leakage, illegal accessing and connecting to a
malicious IoT, etc. In this section, we firstly analyze security and privacy
requirements of IoT physical objects in the connection status. And then,
we make a survey on the existing security and privacy-preserving tech-
nologies for them.3
3.1. Security and privacy requirements for physical objects in connection
state
The security and privacy requirements for physical objects in
connection state are usually closely related to the mode of their accessing
or connecting to the IoT. In general, the IoT objects’ connection modes
can be roughly classified into two kinds according to the number of the
physical objects accessing the same point of the IoT simultaneously,
which are single access mode and bulk access mode.
3.1.1. Characteristics of the single access mode
Single access mode means that each physical object is individually
connected the IoT. According to the IoT application environment, there
are two situations.
In Unit IoT applications [1], physical objects are usually required to
be registered or pre-deployed in the initialization state. Since the
connection is in the host domain, the security and privacy issues are
relatively simple. For the visited IoT, checking the registration informa-
tion of a physical object is a basic method to prevent illegal node access.
For the object that has access to the IoT in the single access mode,
keeping its registration information confidential is crucial to
anti-counterfeiting, and identifying the authenticity or legitimacy of the
IoT is a prerequisite to avoid connecting to an unfamiliar, malicious IoT
or cyber-entity.
In ubiquitous IoT applications [1], physical objects usually need to
connect to different domains, and the security and privacy problems are
much complicated. For one thing, the identity, role, and attributes of the
physical objects always change with time and space, which requires a
flexible connection admission mechanism so as to make them to access
the IoT ubiquitously. For another, there is no trust relationship between
the visiting physical object and the visited domain, both of them need to
avoid establishing a connection with an illegal or malicious one. Mean-
while, the sensitive data of the physical object should not be revealed to
any strange entity.
3.1.2. Characteristics of the bulk access mode
The bulk access is generally a many-to-one or many-to-many
connection mode for the purpose of high efficiency, which usually oc-
curs in RFID systems, Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) environments, and vehicular
networks. They are characterized by large-scale, concurrent access,
sporadic or intermittent connections, limited communication range, and
so on. And the physical objects’ security and privacy requirements often
vary with the environment.
In the RFID system, an RFID tag is used as the identifier of the physical
object, and it is always the target of attack. Essentially, RFID-based IoT
applications are designed to identify or track physical objects, such as
anti-counterfeiting, supply chain management, andmobile tracking [10].
The secure connection between the tag and the reader is the basis for the
security of the RFID system, as well as the basis for the protection of
physical objects. For instance, attackers may try to use an illegal reader to
read data from legitimate tags, which may lead to physical objects’ pri-
vacy leakage. And at the same time, attackers can also forge a tag to
deceive customers into thinking that the fake productions or physical
objects are authentic. In addition, attackers can eavesdrop on the data
exchanged between the RFID tag and the reader. It is obvious that the
authenticity of the tag and reader are crucial to the security of an RFID
system. Meanwhile, the confidentiality of the data in the tag and the data
exchanged between the tag and the reader is very important to the
physical objects’ privacy.
In the V2G environment, it is very common for multiple electric ve-
hicles to communicate with an aggregator in the smart grid simulta-
neously. Similarly, a roadside unit in the vehicular ad hoc network
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data is closely related to vehicle owners or users, and involves the per-
sonal safety and the economic interests of them and the smart grid pro-
viders, the legitimacy, authenticity of the vehicles, roadside unit, and
aggregator are very important to V2G and Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANET). Furthermore, the exchanged data, especially the sensitive data,
always needs to be kept secret to avoid privacy leakage. Consequently,
the connection or interaction between the vehicle and the access point
(such as the aggregator in V2G, and the roadside unit in VANET) should
be authenticated through privacy-preserving.
3.1.3. Security and privacy requirements analysis
Although the connection modes varying with the application envi-
ronments may lead to changes in security and privacy requirements
accordingly, any connection mode (one-to-one, many-to-one, and many-
to-many) always involves two parts of the initiator and the receiver. If an
illegal object succeeds in launching a connection (as a connection initi-
ator) or defrauding the connection initiator (as a connection target), the
sensitive data may leak, and the related physical objects may suffer some
loss. In order to avoid connecting with dishonest or malicious objects and
leaking privacy, the security and privacy requirements of physical objects
in connection state can be summarized as the following two aspects.
Illegal or malicious object detection: In the single connection
mode, the connection initiator may be a physical object trying to get the
service from the IoT or an IoT object trying to collect data from the
sensors, etc. In the bulk access mode, the connection initiator may be an
IoT access point (such as an RFID reader, a roadside unit or an aggre-
gator, etc.) or a generic physical object trying (such as an RFID tag, an
intelligent vehicle, and so on) to connect the access point. In practice, the
connection initiator and the connection target always vary with the
application and environment. For instance, in most RFID systems, the
reader is usually the connection initiator, and the RFID tag is always the
connection target. And in V2G or VANET, vehicles, the roadside unit and
the aggregator may be either the initiator or the target. Since both the
connection initiator or the connection target (the connected physical
object) may be illegal in the connection process, the illegal or malicious
object detection includes identifying and distinguishing all physical ob-
jects involved in the connection process.
Privacy preserving: Similarly, the privacy requirements usually vary
with environments too. In the ubiquitous IoT, the physical objects
launching a cross-domain access always need to keep its sensitive data
secret from the visited domain. In most RFID-based applications, such as
anti-counterfeiting [10,11], the data in an RFID tag is always confiden-
tial, which represents the identity, state or attributes of the physical
object attached to it. The leakage of RFID data is equivalent to breaching
the object’s privacy and will lead to forgery or other attacks. In V2G or
VANET environment, since vehicles usually carry a lot of owner or user
information, privacy-preserving is always a prerequisite.
3.2. Security and privacy-preserving technologies for physical objects in
connection state
The security and privacy of physical objects in the connection state
are usually achieved by authentication. Since IoT objects are always
resource-constraint and usually have different roles in different envi-
ronments, the authentication mechanisms are often required to be
lightweight and flexible. Furthermore, privacy-preserving is also
demanded during the authentication in many cases. There are mainly
three security authentication schemes for securing the physical objects
connecting to the IoT, which are batch authentication, dynamic
authentication, and biometric authentication.
3.2.1. Batch authentication
Batch authentication schemes are often designed for bulk access
mode, and their main purpose is to detect illegal or malicious physical
objects trying to connect to the authenticator. Since different applications4
have different requirements for privacy protection, these batch authen-
tication schemes are always designed for specific scenarios.
In an RFID system, the connection is often launched by the reader for
reading data from tags. Since the connection is temporary, the commu-
nication resources and computation capabilities are very limited, most
batch authentication schemes focus on efficiency and low overhead. And
for security and privacy-preserving, the tag’s sensitive data exchanged
during the authentication is usually encrypted or blinded. Lei Yang et al.
put forward a prompt and reliable batch authentication scheme for large
scale RFID applications like anti-counterfeiting by verifying the validity
of a batch of tags instead of identifying each tag [12], which can increase
the efficiency significantly. Wei Gong et al. propose a fine-grained batch
authentication scheme for large-scale RFID systems to address the scal-
ability issue in batch authentications [13]. They use informative counting
to lower the computation and communication costs, which can estimate
the accurate numbers of counterfeiting tags and genuine tags. Liu et al.
propose a Grouping-Proofs-Based Authentication (GUPA) protocol to
address the security issue of simultaneously identifying multiple readers
and tags in distributed RFID systems [14]. They adopt a distributed
authentication mode with independent sub-grouping proofs to enhance
hierarchical protection, use an asymmetric denial scheme to strengthen
fault-tolerance capabilities for defending against the illegal/malicious
reader or tag, and present a sequence-based odd-even alternation group
subscript to define a lightweight function for secret updating.
In V2G and VANET environments, the characteristics of high speed,
short communication range, and temporary connection require the
aggregator (or roadside unit) and the vehicles to finish mutual authen-
tication quickly [15]. At the same time, the privacy preservation is a
prerequisite during the admission authentication. For these purposes,
many batch authentication schemes are designed from different technical
perspectives. Shunrong Jiang et al. put forward an efficient anonymous
HMAC-based batch authentication scheme for VANETs to overcome the
heavy overhead and privacy disclosure problems in PKI-based batch
authentication [16,17]. They used Identity-Based Signature (IBS) and
HMAC to realize batch authentication, and adopt pseudonyms to achieve
conditional privacy-preserving. Huaqun Guo et al. put forward a batch
authentication protocol [18,19] for V2G. The scheme in Ref. [19] is
called Unique Batch Authentication Protocol for Vehicle-to-Grid
(UBAPV2G). But Huei-Ru Tseng found that the batch authentication
scheme UBAPV2G was not secure, and he pointed out that either the
vehicle or aggregator can easily generate a collection of bogus signatures
to make the batch verification succeed [20]. Liu H et al. thought that
Battery Vehicles (BVs) had different security challenges when they work
in different modes and proposed an Aggregated-proofs-based
Privacy-preserving Authentication (AP3A) scheme to achieve batch
authentication [21]. In addition, AP3A introduces the aggregated
pseudo-status variation to collect multiple BVs’ power status, since no
individual data is revealed, and the privacy-preserving is achieved during
the batch authentication.
3.2.2. Dynamic authentication
Dynamic authentication refers to the achievement of verification
through different standards or certifications under different circum-
stances, which is the security basis for cross-domain access and ubiqui-
tous connections. Furthermore, privacy-preserving is crucial in these
scenarios, and the existing schemes for dynamic authentication are al-
ways required to provide privacy protection.
Hong Liu et al. designed two privacy protection authentication
schemes for V2G networks in smart grids according to the battery status
of electric vehicles [22] and their roles [23]. The former argues that there
are three kinds of battery status, and different status faces different se-
curity and privacy problems. They use aggregate identifiers in the
charging status to ensure that battery vehicles can be authenticated
during the connection process without disclosing their real identities. At
the same time, they employ the selective unblocking method to realize
the anonymous data transmission when the vehicles are in the charging
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transition from discharging to charging, thereby hiding the vehicle’s
power from the aggregator. The latter classifies the battery vehicles into
three roles of energy demander, energy storage, and energy supplier
according to the battery status and proposes a role-dependent privacy--
preserving scheme to achieve secure interactions between a vehicle and
the smart grid. Refs. [22,23] Have some similarities in classification, but
Ref. [23] focuses on designing the interlinked sub-protocols for battery
vehicles to deal with the different privacy problems. Meanwhile, they
also illustrated how to protect the vehicles’ security and privacy in both
the centralized and distributed discharging operations when a BV feeds
energy back into the grid.
3.2.3. Biometric authentication
Biometric authentication is usually used in the scenario of physical
objects accessing the unit IoT. Due to the uniqueness of some biometric
characteristics, and they can be securely registered with the IoT in
advance, the biometric authentication makes the physical object to ac-
cess or connect to IoT conveniently. Since the invariance of biometric
characteristics can ensure the consistency of the identities of the physical
objects in physical space and IoT/cyberspace, the biometric authentica-
tion has distinct advantages in identifying the fake, malicious, and illegal
nodes. For human beings, the common biometric proof may be the
fingerprint, iris, face, etc. Pengfei Hu et al. put forward a face identifi-
cation resolution framework based on the cloud [24] and fog [25]
computing respectively for physical objects connecting to the IoT or
being mapped from the physical space to cyberspace. At the same time,
they also gave the corresponding security solution for the biometric data
to preserve the object’s privacy [25]. In addition, fingerprint and iris are
often used for admission control. And for an IoT device, the biometric
proofs are usually the fingerprint/digest or the pair of the challenge and
response from its Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). The finger-
print/digest or PUF-based authentication schemes have similar ideas to
those schemes based on the biometric data of human beings. Neverthe-
less, most PUF schemes focus on how to construct and use it to realize
authentication, and how to deal with the noise generated by the PUF
[26].
4. Security and privacy issues of physical objects in in-working
In the working stage, physical objects at different layers have
different tasks and face different security and privacy problems.
Furthermore, the same physical object may undertake different tasks in
different spatiotemporal environment. Accordingly, their security and
privacy requirements usually changes with the tasks and environments.
So it is necessary and wise to study the physical objects’ security and
privacy problems according to their tasks instead of themselves. For
clarity, we will first analyze the security and privacy requirements for
physical objects in working according to their tasks and environments.
And then, the corresponding security and privacy-preserving technolo-
gies or solutions will be surveyed by reviewing the related literature in
detail.
4.1. Security and privacy requirements for physical objects in working
In general, the tasks of physical objects in working can be classified
into data collection, data transmission, data processing, and data using.
Accordingly, the security and privacy requirements will be analyzed from
the four aspects.
4.1.1. Security and privacy requirements for data collection
There are two types of data collection. One is that a physical object
(including the gateway and the normal nodes) or user collects the data
from the object that undertakes the perceptual task, and the other is that
physical objects act as the actuator or executor to receive the instructions
from the control center, other physical objects or users.5
The first type is the most common, where security and privacy threats
are similar to those in wireless sensor networks, mainly including attacks
on physical objects and their data. In addition, the attack on time syn-
chronization cannot be ignored. Attacks on physical objects mainly
include draining the battery of the sensing/sensing node working in the
wrong mode, and being compromised as well. And the examples of at-
tacks on the physical objects’ data include eavesdropping, replaying,
tampering, and even hijacking the perceived data during the data
collection. Meanwhile, it is also a common attack to pretend to be a
legitimate physical object to collect data and report false data to a
legitimate data collector. All these threats or attacks may make the IoT
system unavailable, reduce the accuracy, cause the leakage of perception
data or the privacy of physical objects, lead to wrong decisions, and even
put the related physical objects or users in danger. In order to ensure the
safety of data collection, the following three requirements should be met.
Malicious physical object detection: The malicious physical object
is the most harmful threat in data collection. Malicious physical object
detection has two levels of meanings.
 The normal physical object should be able to identify the malicious/
illegal physical object so as to resist the various attacks by itself and
avoid the data/privacy leakage, which usually needs the help of fault/
intrusion detection system and authentication mechanism.
 The normal physical object can differentiate between malicious re-
quests and legitimate ones so as to avoid data/privacy leakage and
wrong action. This ability is usually achieved by message or identity
authentication mechanism.
Securing routing: Securing routing in data collection is responsible
for sending the sensed data to the gateway and sending the control
command to the specified executor, which is the basis of the successful
data collection and should meet the following three requirements.
 The data can be routed to the destination correctly, which needs the
support of the effective routing protocols.
 The integrity of the routed data should be kept, which is usually
realized by cryptographic hash function or message authentication
code.
 The data does come from the claimed physical object, which is
essentially the requirement for the authenticity of the data source,
and it can be guaranteed by signature or message authentication
code.
Privacy preserving: In some cases of data collection, privacy-
preserving is required by physical objects and/or users. For instance,
the data in smart health is always required to be kept secret so as to
protect the privacy and safe of patients. In general, the privacy require-
ment in data collection involves two aspects of data privacy-preserving
and identity privacy-preserving.
 Data privacy-preserving requires the data to be kept secret from the
unauthorized physical objects or users, which is usually achieved by
encryption or access control mechanism.
 Identity privacy-preserving demands keeping the user or physical
object’s identity secret. Since the identity is always labeled by its
related attribute data and can be deduced from these data, it is
essentially required to keep the identity-related data secret. So ano-
nymity, encrypting and blinding the related attribute data are the
common way of preserving identity privacy.
For the second case of data collection, the instruction may come from
malicious/illegal nodes and the wrong or malicious instructions may lead
to incorrect behavior, data leakage, or even destruction or damage of the
actuator/executor. Therefore, the legality, validity, authenticity and
integrity of the instruction are of great importance. The physical objects
(including the sensor, the actuator, or executor) that receive instructions
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the instruction and its senders have to be authenticated. At the same
time, the sensitive or critical instructions are always required to be kept
secret.
4.1.2. Security and privacy requirements for data transmission
Data transmission in physical objects’ working status indicates
transmitting the aggregated data from the gateway or other boundary
nodes to the fog nodes, data center or control center, cloud, and so on.
Similar to transmitting the private data over the public network, it is
always required to ensure the data security, and the authenticity of the
source and the destination. The authentication and end-to-end encryp-
tion mechanisms are the common solutions. Due to the diversity of the
access networks, the variety and resource limitations of the gateway or
boundary nodes, these common solutions cannot work well in data
transmission, and the special security and privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms are always required, which can be categorized into the following
three kinds.
 Lightweight security transportation protocols, which is the basis of
secure data transmission.
 Lightweight data security mechanism, including lightweight data
integrity authentication and data encryption mechanism.
 Lightweight and flexible mutual authentication mechanism, which
may be required to provide privacy-preserving simultaneously in
some cases.
4.1.3. Security and privacy requirements for data processing
The security and privacy problems in data processing are mainly
caused by intelligent computing and cloud computing technologies, such
as data mining, outsource computing, and so on. Security problems
mainly include data loss or leakage, and abuse as well. The privacy in-
formation that may be disclosed mainly includes the location, prefer-
ences, behaviors, identity, and others that may be derived from the
sensed or aggregated data. So the data processing should meet the
following two requirements.
 Secure cloud computing platform, which is not only the basis of
secure data processing but also the foundation of secure data storage.
 The data processing algorithm with privacy-preserving, which is the
basic method to avoid reasoning privacy.
4.1.4. Security and privacy requirements for data sharing
The security and privacy problems in data sharing are mainly caused
by improper, few or no security restrictions on data sharing. At present,
access control is a common and effective solution for secure data sharing,
and there are many access control mechanisms that can meet data
sharing requirements in different environments. In the IoT, the data to be
shared may be on the cloud or in the physical object. For the former, most
access control policies are designed either by the data owner or by both
the owner and the cloud server. And the access to the data on the cloud is
usually controlled by the cloud server instead of the data owner himself.
Therefore, the security depends largely on the cloud server, and privacy
may be breached unknowingly, which may further lead to serious
problems. For the latter, data sharing can be controlled completely by the
physical object itself, but resource limitations make the conventional
access control mechanism unable to work normally. Whether sharing
data in the cloud or physical objects, the data owner always wants to
control it based on their own judgment. In order to share data securely
with privacy-preserving, the access control schemes should have the
following four characteristics [2].
 Automatical, autonomic access control means that the data owner can
share its data as it wishes, or the access control policy can be made
and performed by the data owner itself.6
 Fine-grained, the fine-grained access control is the basis of ensuring
the security of data sharing and privacy-preserving, which relies on
the granularity of the data to be shared and the access control policy.
 Dynamic, the ever-changing IoT environment requires dynamic ac-
cess control mechanism to achieve data sharing with minimum in-
formation leakage.
 Lightweight, the resource-limited physical object needs lightweight
access control mechanism to share data, which is the guarantee of
practicability.
It should be stated that dynamic and lightweight requirements for
access control are also for the authentication in many data-sharing cases
because access control mechanisms always depend on authentication.
4.2. Security and privacy-preserving technologies for physical objects in
working
Corresponding to the security and privacy requirements analyses in
Section 4.1, the security and privacy-preserving technologies for physical
objects in working are summarized according to their tasks.
4.2.1. Security and privacy-preserving technologies for data collection
Security and privacy technologies for data collection can be catego-
rized into four aspects of detection technology, key management,
authentication and privacy-preserving.
Detection technology: The detection technology of data collection
mainly includes fault detection and intrusion detection, which are used
to distinguish the faulty physical object or malicious physical object from
the normal ones. Currently, most existing solutions are designed for
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), which are also suitable for the IoT.
Different detectionmethods need different measures and techniques. The
localized fault detection algorithm for identifying the faulty nodes in
WSN [27], and the intrusion detection for homogeneous and heteroge-
neous WSNs [28] are the typical fault detection and intrusion detection,
respectively. While Tie Qiu et al. come up with a safe time synchroni-
zation model to detect the malicious node so as to avoid the attack on
timestamps or data replay [29]. With the rapid development of the IoT
and the disappearance of boundaries, the typical detection technologies
cannot work well in the perception layer [1]. In order to deal with this
problem, artificial immunity and machine learning technologies are
employed in fault or malicious physical objects identification. And the
feature selection and modeling based on data mining are also introduced
to locate the infected physical objects. These new Artificial Intelligent
(AI) technologies are considered to be able to improve the conventional
detection methods to a certain degree.
At the same time, intrusion tolerance technologies are used to reduce
the harm caused by faulty or malicious physical objects, which can make
the legitimate physical objects work well when there are temporarily
inactive or permanently unavailable physical objects by making multiple
physical objects collaborate together. An example is the data-driven
robust algorithm for the IoT in smart cities, which is put forward by
Tie Qiu et al. This algorithm uses the big data of smart cities to improve
the robustness of topology against malicious attacks [9].
In addition, in order to resist attacks from malicious physical objects,
the self-detection is becoming a necessary technology in the phase of
physical object’s design and booting [30]. For instance, some IoT devices
have been designed to carry an error detection system, and some IoT
devices are required to boot securely by authenticating the integrity of its
software. It is very common in smartphones.
Key management: Key management is the basis of all the cryptog-
raphy-based security and privacy-preserving schemes. Due to the nature
of resource constraints, most of the existing key management technolo-
gies for IoT objects concentrate on lightweight, mainly including pre-
distributed key schemes, public key-based key management schemes,
and PUF-based key management scheme.
The pre-distributed key management scheme is very common and
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based key pre-distribution scheme for large-scale static WSN in Ref. [31].
And the probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes are very popular, such
as the random key chain pre-distribution [32] and the random pair-wise
key scheme [33]. In addition, Zahid et al. put forward a distributed
multi-party key management based on chaotic mapping and Chebyshev
polynomial [34]. Nevertheless, the pre-distributed key management
schemes always have many limitations, e.g., poor flexibility and low--
security strength, which make them unfit for the physical objects in the
distributed environment and ubiquitous IoT.
The public key-based key management scheme is relatively easy to
implement in the distributed environment, but the overhead is a critical
factor. Only the low-power public key encryption algorithms are prom-
ising candidates for IoT, such as elliptic curve cryptography [35,36]. In
addition, there are other lightweight public key-based key management
schemes designed for the distributed IoT application, such as PAuthKey
[37], which uses implicit certificates and provides application-level
end-to-end security.
The PUF-based key management uses the physical unclonable prop-
erty of the circuit. Most of them are still based on the idea of Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, but there is no need to exchange responses to
generate keys. Furthermore, the PUF-based key does not need to be
stored in the non-volatile memory, and will not be lost as the device is
lost, because the key can be generated as needed. Although these ad-
vantages make the PUF-based key promising, it is hard to achieve in
practical application. The current research focuses on how to generate
the PUF key [38–44].
Authentication: In data collection, authentication is used to ensure
the authenticity of the physical object and the integrity of the data. Due
to the limitation of resources, most of the authentication schemes focus
on lowering costs. For instance, Peris et al. [45] and Molnar et al. [46]
propose two lightweight mutual authentication protocols for RFID tags
and readers. The former claims that it can provide an adequate security
level for certain applications at the cost of slightly more than 300 gates,
and the latter uses shared secret and pseudo-random functions to ensure
the integrity and authenticity of messages exchanged between tags and
readers. In order to meet the high security and reliability requirements
for data in smart health, Wei Liu et al. [47] put forward a
yoking-proof-based authentication protocol for cloud-assisted wearable
devices. They use a physical unclonable function and lightweight cryp-
tographic operators to realize mutual authentication between a smart-
phone and two wearable devices. Hong Liu et al. [48] introduced the
hash-based selective disclosure mechanism and Chebyshev chaotic map
to achieve mutual authentication between a wearable device and a
smartphone.
At the same time, the multicast is the main communication mode in
IoT data collection, and lightweight multicast authentication is indis-
pensable. Since the receivers of multicast data usually do not trust each
other, the multicast authentication mechanisms are usually based on
asymmetric methods. The common multicast authentication schemes
include public key-based multicast authentication schemes [49,50];
symmetric key-based multicast authentication schemes [51,52]; and
one-time signature-based authentication schemes [53,54]. The first and
the last are inherently asymmetric. And the second is essential to
construct an asymmetric property on the symmetric key and one-way
hash function. Due to the limited resources and the distributed envi-
ronment, neither public key nor one-time signature-based schemes can
work well for IoT data collection. The symmetric key-based multicast
authentication scheme is the preferred one. For different scenarios, there
are different symmetric key-based multicast authentication schemes. For
instance, Xuanxia Yao et al. put a lightweight multicast authentication
mechanism based on the revised Nyberg’s fast one-way accumulator for
small scale multicast applications [55], which enables the data sender to
specify the data receivers, and the data receivers are able to verify the
authenticity of a data source at low cost.
Privacy preserving: Privacy-preserving technologies used in data7
collection mainly include encryption, anonymity, obfuscation, data ag-
gregation, and onion routing as well.
Encryption is a usual way to maintain data privacy. Since the data is
directly encrypted, privacy is naturally preserved. There are two situa-
tions for anonymity. One is that the data is reported by an anonym, and
the anonymous data reporting protocol proposed by Yao et al. [56] is a
typical example. The other method is to anonymize the data before
submitting it to the collectors, which is essentially similar to obfuscation
and always combined with data aggregation. There are many works on
anonymous data aggregation, including anonymous grouping message
[57], Grouping-proofs-based authentication [58], aggregated
proofs-based authentication [21], and anonymous message submission
[59]. Their common purpose is to prevent the data collector from
tracking the submitter.
Onion routing is designed to prevent privacy leakage caused by the
traffic analysis. Since the backward and forward routing is anonymous, it
cannot be tracked, and the privacy of the source and the destination is
preserved. At the same time, all kinds of attacks based on the routing can
be avoided by the obfuscated or anonymized routing data.
4.2.2. Security and privacy-preserving technologies for data transmission
Security and privacy-preserving technologies for data transmission
are mainly a variety of authentication protocols and secure transport
protocols with the characteristic of lightweight. The former is used to
verify the legality of the data sender and receiver [47,48], which have
been analyzed at length in data collection. And the latter is designed for
sending data to the remote data center or cloud, which usually covers
encryption, authentication, and integrity check. In practice, these tech-
nologies are not always required. For instance, privacy-preserving is
optional in environmental monitoring but is a prerequisite in smart
health.
The long-distance data transmission is often based on IP communi-
cation, IPv6 over low-power personal area networks (6LoWPAN) is a
good choice, which can carry out IPSec on IPv6 nodes (such as the edge
physical object or the gateway) to make them communicate with the data
or control center safely without any modification on them. And many
end-to-end secure transport protocols are designed on it. For instance,
Raza et al. [60] extend the low-power personal area networks (LoWPAN)
to support the IPSec’s Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulation
Security Payload (ESP) simultaneously for securing the data transmission
from the aspects of confidentiality, authenticity and integrity. Granjal
et al. [61] employ the 6LoWPAN security headers to realize end-to-end
security between the edge physical object/gateway and the data/-
control center.
In addition, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol are also common ways to
secure data transmission. And there are many schemes based on DTLS.
For instance, Dos Santos et al. [62] use DTLS to construct an architecture
for secure communication between the resource-constraint IoT entities.
And Kothmayr et al. [63] design a two-way authentication scheme based
on DTLS. Since these schemes do not only focus on the confidentiality,
authenticity and integrity of the communication but also take the limited
resources into account, they can perform well in securing IoT data
transmission.
4.2.3. Security and privacy-preserving technologies for data processing
Security and privacy-preserving technologies for data processing
mainly include homomorphic computing, secure multiparty computing,
and data mining with privacy-preserving as well. These technologies are
always cross-used to solve the security and privacy problems in data
processing.
The homomorphic computing and secure multiparty computing
technologies are very helpful in addressing the security and privacy
problems in data processing, especially in the calculation. Qian Ping et al.
surveyed the privacy-preserving technologies in the IoT [64] and pointed
out that the homomorphic encryption is very effective for privacy
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on homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computing, but most
of them are not practical in data analysis, classification, feature extrac-
tion, and the alike data processing. On the contrary, the data mining
algorithm with privacy-preserving is much effective to deal with the
non-computational data processing. The privacy-preserving decision
trees over vertically partitioned data is a typical one [65], which can
achieve data classification and privacy-preserving simultaneously. And
Yang et al. try to use the bayesian network to realize privacy-preserving
computation for vertically partitioned data [66].
4.2.4. Security and privacy-preserving technologies for data sharing
Security and privacy-preserving technologies for data-sharing are
usually a variety of access control mechanisms. Since data sharing is al-
ways closely related to the application, most of the existing schemes are
designed for specific scenarios with the purpose of meeting the re-
quirements for autonomy, fine-granularity, dynamics, and lightweight.
For various data-sharing requests, a hierarchical access control
mechanism is always required. Liu H et al. put forward an aggregated-
proof-based hierarchical authentication scheme for the IoT [67], which
uses the directed path descriptors, homomorphism functions, and Che-
byshev chaotic maps jointly to achieve the mutual authentication. Based
on it, the hierarchical access control is achieved by assigning different
access authorities to different data users. Since the proofs are aggregated,
the privacy is preserved simultaneously.
For data sharing in the cloud, since different physical objects may
have a collaborative relationship, both achieving common security and
privacy-preserving and meeting the individual’s security and privacy-
preserving requirements are of very importance. Most of the existing
solutions focus on keeping the physical object’s private data from un-
authorized access by authentication, but the privacy of the physical ob-
ject that requests data sharing is always ignored. To preserve the privacy
of the data requestor, H Liu and H Ning et al. propose a shared authority-
based privacy-preserving authentication protocol for data sharing in the
cloud [68]. They use the anonymous access request matching mechanism
to share access authority; employ the attribute-based access control to
realize fine-grained and automatic access control; apply proxy
re-encryption to keep the security for the dynamic data sharing. Xuanxia
Yao et al. present an anonymous credential-based access control scheme
to share the data in the cloud [69], which can achieve a flexible and
lightweight cipher text sharing. And at the same time, the physical object
that makes the data sharing request is kept anonymous. In addition, Hong
Liu et al. put forward the cooperative privacy preservation in authenti-
cation and access control for the wearable devices in hybrid (edge and
cloud) computing environment [70]. It can meet the secure data sharing
and privacy-preserving requirements for physical objects in the dynamic
environment.
For data sharing in the physical object, Xuanxia Yao et al. design a
lightweight attribute-based encryption scheme based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) [2], which can avoid using bilinear pair mapping to
realize lightweight, and construct the access control policy according to
the access tree and perform an access control of attribute-based encryp-
tion to achieve a flexible, dynamic and fine-grained access control.
5. Security and privacy issues of physical objects in post-working
In the stage of post-working, physical objects are generally idled or
discarded. In most cases, their security and privacy problems are often
ignored by their owners, which make them vulnerable to being attack
targets (such as being captured, compromised, or reused by attackers)
and face serious security threats and privacy leakage challenges. For
clarity, the security and privacy-preserving requirements of the physical
objects in post-working are also firstly analyzed in detail. And then, the
security and privacy-preserving technologies for physical objects in post-
working will be surveyed by reviewing the related literature.8
5.1. Security and privacy requirements of physical objects in post-working
In general, there are three kinds of situations for a physical object in
post-working. 1) It will be captured by an attacker when it has retired or
is working. 2) It has been damaged or malfunctions. 3) It is normally
retired from the IoT. The first two situations are abnormal or passive
withdrawal from the IoT. And physical objects in the first situation are
completely out of the control of its owner or user, and its data may be
stolen by attackers. Of course, they may be reconnected to the IoT by
attackers. Meanwhile, physical objects in the second situation may be
repaired and sent back to the IoT by legal or illegal users. Similar to the
first two situations, physical objects in the third situation may also enter
the IoT under specific circumstances. In summary, the physical objects re-
accessing the IoT can be classified into two categories: normal nodes and
replay nodes.
For all three situations, the possible attacks on physical objects in
post-working can be roughly classified into three kinds: physical attack,
data theft, and replay attacks. In essence, the last two attacks are usually
the targets of the first one. The physical attack is often launched directly
by capturing the target. And stealing/obtaining data from the physical
object in post working is usually realized by physically or logically
decomposing the captured objects. The replying attack has two mean-
ings: one is to try to use the captured physical object in post working to
access the IoT for getting the unauthorized data and services, or for
attacking the IoT itself. The other meaning is to reuse its data to create a
fake physical object to access the IoT.
Accordingly, the security and privacy requirements can be summa-
rized into physical security, data security and replaying detection.
 Physical security: Physical security refers to keep the physical objects
in a safe environment or far from being captured by illegal/malicious
users. Since the retired physical objects are always ignored, they are
vulnerable to being captured and utilized by attackers, and further
threaten the security and privacy of the working physical objects and
the IoT. The physical security is the foundation of the physical ob-
jects’ security.
 Data security: In most cases, the purpose of capturing a physical ob-
ject is to obtain its data or tamper with its data to obtain unauthorized
data and services. The captured physical objects may be a normal
cyber entity, a damaged physical object, or a retired one. And the
latter two are more common because they are usually ignored and
easily captured. No matter what kind the captured physical object is,
its data is always closely related to the security of the application and
the privacy of the physical object itself or its users. The disclosure of
these data will threaten not only the security and privacy of the object
and its user, but also the security of the IoT and the corresponding
application, and even lead many related physical objects to leak their
sensitive data. It can be said that data security is the basic and crucial
requirement to ensure the security and privacy of the physical objects
in post-working, which requires their data to be kept secret from, or
not to be leaked to, any unauthorized objects.
 Replaying identification or detection: The corrupted or the fake
physical object is always used by the illegal user to reconnect to the
IoT. We call it physical object replaying. And the retired or the
repaired physical objects may be reused to work by the authorized
users, which is treated as reworking instead of replaying. Identifying
the replayed physical object from the normal ones (reworking and
normally working objects) is crucial to the security of the IoT.
5.2. Security and privacy-preserving technologies for physical objects in
post-working
The security and privacy technologies for physical objects in post-
working are designed to meet the security and privacy requirements
analyzed in Section 5.1. For physical security, it is usually guaranteed by
physical measures and management means. Both of them are to
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objects in a safe environment or prevent them from being captured by
attackers. Since it is beyond the security and privacy-preserving technical
specification, it is not discussed here. For replaying detection or identi-
fication, it is essentially the security issues of the physical objects in pre-
working or during connecting to the IoT, which is usually achieved by
authentication. Since it has been discussed in Section 3, we just focus on
the technologies to ensure the captured, damaged and retired physical
objects’ data security. There are roughly two directions, which are
hardware-oriented technologies and software-oriented technologies.
5.2.1. Hardware-oriented technologies for data security
Hardware-oriented security and privacy-preserving technologies are
generally used to destroy the objects physically when they run abnor-
mally. The purpose of the physical destruction is to make the captured
physical objects unable to re-access the IoT and their data unable to be
read out. There are roughly two directions, which are transient
electronics-based methods and circuit-based methods.
Transient electronics is a promising technology for self-deciding the
death of the chip, which explores the characteristics of water solubility or
chemical corrosion of transient materials, so that the chip will physically
disappear or function to self-destruct in a controlled and triggered
manner [71]. The water-soluble transient materials are mainly used in
fields where the security requirement is very high, and the unused or
abandoned physical objects are required to vanish, such as military and
medicine. The chemically corrosive agent is usually used to disrupt the
function of the physical object, and the microfluidic system or
Micro-Fluidic Self-destruct Device (MFSD) is designed to destroy the
structure and the data of the microchip in an abnormal environment
[72]. Xinwei Gu et al. put forward a self-absorption and self-destruct
system based on micro-fluidic for the memory chip according to the
characteristics of the abnormal environment and conducted a simulation
research on the new MFSD for microchips [73]. In their simulation, the
system is able to generate a chemical preparation and spray it on the chip
to destruct the structure of the chip and erase the data in the memory
permanently when it senses that it is disassembled. Thereby, the struc-
ture and the data of the device will not be disclosed even it is dis-
assembled. Of course, the device cannot be used by an attacker to
re-connect the IoT.
The circuit-based methods are usually achieved by the open circuit or
short circuit and can be controlled by external operation or command.
Jin-Woo Han et al. presented a self-destructible fin flip-flop actuated
channel transistor, which applies a trigger voltage to a trigger gate me-
chanically for generating electrostatic bending stress to shatter the
source/drain extension region of the fin [74]. Since an open circuit at the
individual transistor level is formed, the designed function of the chip is
destroyed. The Micro-electromechanical Systems (MEMS) initiator is a
micro detonating device with low detonating power and small volume,
which is widely used in many fields [75,76]. It is also a solution to realize
the Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) self-destruction. The
circuits of the ASIC will be destroyed immediately when the MEMSmetal
bridge is excited by a pulse current. Zhao Yue et al. presented a novel
ASIC self-destruction technology at the chip level by integrating the
MEMS metal bridge initiator and the ASIC [77]. It can destruct the ASIC
when receiving the command for destroying the device. Consequently,
the related device or physical object cannot be utilized by malicious or
illegal users.
In addition to mechanical trigger and command, both of the two self-
destruction technologies may be driven by the energy of the node in the
wireless sensor network so as to destroy it timely [78]. Meanwhile,
letting the malicious nodes self-destruct can also protect the physical
objects [79].
5.2.2. Software-oriented technologies for data security
Software-oriented security and privacy technologies for the physical
objects in post-working mainly include encryption schemes and access9
control mechanisms. Both of them are designed to ensure that the (sen-
sitive) data can only be accessed by the legally authorized users in a
specific time interval and environment, but thoroughly unreadable/un-
recoverable for all unauthorized users.
Encryption schemes: As the basic means of data security and
privacy-preserving, encryption is also a common method for protecting
the physical objects in post-working. The basic idea is to store the data in
cypher-text and destroy the decryption key after a certain time. Without
the decryption key, unauthorized users cannot recover the data in the
captured physical objects. Consequently, the data security and privacy
can be preserved. At the same time, an attacker is unable to exploit the
captured physical object to reconnect to the IoT because their data are no
longer available without the decryption key. And the replay attacks can
also be avoided.
In practice, the encryption schemes are always closely related to the
applications. Radia Perlman tried to make the data of physical objects in
post-working unrecoverable after a specific time by putting all key op-
erations (including key creating, key using and key destroying) in one
place [80]. Essentially, it is a centralized key management approach,
which is not appropriate for the distributed IoT environment. In
cloud-based IoT, most of physical objects’ data are often stored in the
cloud. And the attribute-based encryption mechanism [81,82] and
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [83,84] are two common approaches for
protecting the physical objects in post-working. In addition, the methods
of combining different technologies are also very common. Lingfang
Zeng et al. put forward a self-destructing data system by integrating the
cryptographic techniques with active storage techniques [85]. Jinbo
Xiong et al. combined the IDentity-based Timed-Release Encryption
(IDTRE) algorithm with the distributed hash table to realize full lifecycle
privacy-preserving [84].
Access control mechanisms: For physical objects in post-working,
access control is always the prerequisite for their security and privacy-
preserving. And authentication is generally the basis of access control.
Due to the resource constraints, both the authentication and access
control are required to be lightweight. In order to limit the access or reuse
of the data of the physical objects in post-working, biometric information
and device fingerprints are often used to achieve authentication and
access control. For instance, PUF-based authentication protocols are
often used to identify the unauthorized access requesters, which can
ensure the authenticity of the accessor and achieve access control on
physical objects in all stages. The existing research on PUF-based
authentication mainly focuses on two directions: One is error correc-
tion methods [26], and the other is how to construct a PUF or how to
generate the response to a challenge [86]. In practice, PUF may be
combined with the user’s biometric or intrinsic attributes to achieve
access control [87], and used with cryptographic technologies to com-
plete device authentication [88] as well.
6. Challenges and future directions
The rapid development of microelectronics technology has made the
size of IoT objects smaller and smaller, the form/structure more andmore
diverse, and the functions more and more abundant. At the same time,
cloud computing and edge computing technologies provide IoT objects
with efficient computing, storage, and latency solutions. As a result,
ubiquitous computing enabled by IoT has been widely used in various
fields. In the environment of everything interconnecting, physical objects
have to face many new security and privacy challenges. Meanwhile, the
booming microelectronics technology, biometric information technol-
ogy, and cryptographic technology also give promising directions for
security and privacy-preserving technologies. In order to figure out the
security and privacy challenges faced by physical objects and explore
future directions, the related works are summarized and compared in
Table 1.
Table 1
Related research: Summary and comparison.
Refs Physical objects’
status
Security Goals Methods or Technologies Privacy
preserving
Lightweight Scenarios
[1,6–30,
64]
All Survey Survey U2IoT/IoT
[10–14] Batch connection anti-counterfeiting security access
fault tolerance
Batch authentication ✓ ✓ RFID system
[15–17] Batch connection Security access Batch verification ✓ ✓ VANET
[18–23] Batch connection Security access Batch authentication ✓ V2G
[24–26] Single connection Security access Biometric/PUF authentication ✓ Cloud, Fog based IoT
[9,27,28] Data collection Fault/Intrusion detection Comparison/Data-driven WSN Smart city
[31–33] In working Key Gen Pre-key distribution ✓ WSN, IoT
[35–37] In working Key Gen Public key WSN, IoT
[38–44] In working Key Gen PUF key ✓ IoT
[45,46] In working Objects Authenticity Mutual authentication ✓ ✓ RFID system
[47,48] In working Objects Authenticity Mutual authentication ✓ ✓ Cloud/fog based BAN
[49,50,53,
54]
Data collection Authenticity of data sources Public key/one-time signature-based
Multicast authentication
General
[51,52,55] Data collection Authenticity of data sources Symmetric key based Multicast
authentication
✓ WSN, IoT
[56,57,59] Data collection Legality of data sources Anonymous authentication ✓ IoT
[21,58] Data collection Legality of objects Proof-aggregated authentication ✓ ✓ IoT
[60–63] Data transmission End-to-end data security 6LOWPAN DTLS ✓ WSN Ad Hoc
[65,66] Data processing Prevent inference privacy Data partitioned vertically ✓ Data classification
[2,67–70] Data sharing Secure data sharing Anonymous access control ✓ ✓ IoT
[71–79] Post-working Data security, IoT security Device self-destruct ✓ Military, medical
applications
[80–85] Post-working Data security, IoT security Data destroy ✓ Military, medical
applications
[86–88] Post-working Data security, IoT security Access control ✓ PUF devices
[89,90] All Objects management Block chain Ubiquitous IoT
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According to Table 1 and the analyses in Section 2, 3, 4 and 5, security
and privacy challenges that physical objects may face in ubiquitous IoT
can be categorized into seven aspects.
 Both the conventional pre-distributed key management method and
the public key-based key management scheme cannot work well in
the IoT-based pervasive computing environment. Since any two
strange physical objects may need to communicate with each other at
any time, all static key management schemes and those based on the
trusted third party schemes are unable to meet their requirements for
the random or dynamic key negotiation, which further limits the data
exchange and brings serious security and privacy problems.
 The edge computing-based IoT faces many new security and privacy
vulnerabilities. As the bridge between the cloud and the perception
network, the edge node is close to not only the data source but also
the local data centers, which make it the attack target, and its related
sensitive information be vulnerable to leakage.
 The completely distributed and highly dynamic environment of the
IoT-enabled ubiquitous computing needs to balance the relations
among the service, security and privacy as well. Better service and
stronger security always need detailed personal data, but higher
privacy demands minimum data disclosure, which makes the existing
static security and privacy technologies cannot well meet the dynamic
security and privacy-preserving requirements of the physical objects.
 The IoT-based ubiquitous computing often needs data sharing and
data use across security domain or unit IoT, which makes the sharing
and use of sensitive data face very complex security and privacy is-
sues. For instance, How can a data owner effectively outsource its
data with confidentiality?
 A physical object often needs to communicate with an unfamiliar
object in another different security domain. The establishment of a
basic trust relationship for the two physical objects that do not know
each other is the foundation of their security and privacy.
 How to prevent unauthorized users from accessing physical objects is
the basis for ensuring the security and privacy of the objects and their10owner. Although using the biometric information to bind the physical
objects with its owner is a popular solution, there are still many new
security and privacy problems to be solved.
 With the development of blockchain, it seems to be a trend to use
blockchain to manage physical objects [89]. Nevertheless, the public
ledger makes the users have to face the new security and privacy
breach challenges.
6.2. Future directions
There are many open issues published for advice or solutions to deal
with confronting and emerging security and privacy challenges. In
summary, the following seven directions are worthy of further study.
 With the development of a microelectronic technique, it is a prom-
ising option to study the security of IoT devices from the design phase,
which can protect the physical objects from the physical or hardware
perspective.
 The dynamic, lightweight, and flexible key management scheme is
the foundation to meet the security and privacy requirements of the
physical objects in the distributed, large-scale IoT or ubiquitous
computing environment.
 Using machine learning and data mining technology to obtain or
predict the privacy and security requirements of physical objects in
context is a promising solution, which further makes it possible to
provide dynamic security and privacy-preserving as required.
 As a distributed and tamper-resistant ledger, blockchain is a prom-
ising technology to provide security solutions for IoT [90], including
managing and securing the IoT data and devices. It is urgent to study
how to preserve the physical objects and their users’ privacy while
securing their security on the blockchain.
 Letting the physical objects design, manage the access control policy
by themselves and directly control who can access their data is an
ideal solution to secure data and preserve privacy, which requires an
autonomous access control mechanism.
 An efficient, fully homomorphic encryption scheme can meet the
requirements of sensitive data sharing and use. It is the basis of
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based IoT and edge computing-based IoT.
 A lightweight, secure multiparty computation scheme is an effective
way to establish a basic trust relationship for two strange physical
objects, which is a common problem that needs to be solved urgently
in ubiquitous IoT.
7. Conclusion
In order to solve the complicated, dynamic and numerous security
and privacy problems of physical objects in the IoT, the life cycle of
physical objects is divided into three stages: pre-working, in-working,
and post-working. According to the physical object’s working status, an
IoT security architecture is put forward. From the perspective of
analyzing the security and privacy requirements of physical objects in
different working status/stage, the corresponding security and privacy-
preserving technologies are surveyed and sorted out. On this basis, the
challenges and future research directions for the security and privacy
issues of physical objects are also analyzed and summarized. Since the
security and privacy-preserving technologies for physical objects in IoT
can also be applied to the entities in other networks, the survey is also
helpful to protect the physical objects in the whole cyberspace.
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